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This paper contends that the regime selection probability can provide an “empirically 
justifiable” alternative to the GL index as a measurement of intra-industry trade. The regime 
selection probability is an average of sample selection probability that each trade flow data 
comes from inter-industry trade (or equivalently from intra-industry trade). It measures the 
extent to which a given set of observations is explained by the inter-industry trade regime (or 
the intra-industry trade regime). The Heckman two-step procedure is used: a probit model is 
fitted first to a separation indicator, and then the estimated parameters are incorporated into the 
unconditional probability equation for the second stage estimation. The sample selection model 
requires an auxiliary separation indicator to partition the sample, so that each of its elements 
may match up with either comparative advantage or product differentiation with scale 
economies. 
As it is a selection criterion based on “empirical regularities” for separating intra-industry 
trade from inter-industry trade, the regime selection probability can improve upon the GL 
index as a relevant indicator of intra-industry trade. It can also be used to infer a transition in 
trade patterns, since a change in its value indicates how a shifting of explanatory power from 
comparative advantage to product differentiation takes place. 
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For a given mode of international transactions, one particular model explains the bilateral 
volume of trade better than another model. A standard model that focuses on relative factor 
abundance as a source of comparative advantage is appropriate for explaining inter-industry 
trade in homogeneous goods. A monopolistic competition model based on product 
differentiation with scale economies well explains the exchange of varieties or intra-industry 
trade. If trading partners have identical factor proportions, no inter-industry trade is caused by 
comparative advantage. On the other hand, if the differences in factor proportions between the 
trading partners are large enough to rule out factor price equalization and diversification of 
production, all inter-industry trade results.1 However, it is too simplistic to relate all the 
observations either to inter-industry or to intra-industry trade. If these two models are mutually 
exclusive, their shares in total trade sum up to one by definition. Either the share of intra-
industry trade or the share of inter-industry trade constitutes only a fraction in total trade. Each 
individual model cannot explain the whole volume of trade, but only a certain part of trade it is 
responsible for. So it is plausible to explain trade volume by a mixture of the two competing 
models. 
The Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index is a widely used indicator measuring the extent of intra-
industry trade as opposed to that of inter-industry trade. It is an aggregate indicator, summed 
up over every country pairs on all goods traded. The GL index sorts out the amount of trade 
flows a pair of countries simultaneously import and export. If a country exports and imports 
the same number of varieties simultaneously, there is only intra-industry trade and the GL 
index will be equal to one. On the other hand, if a country either exports or imports each of its 
products unilaterally, no intra-industry trade occurs and the GL index will become zero. This 
index varies from zero (all inter-industry trade) to one (all intra-industry trade), and the sum 
over the shares of the two mutually exclusive forms of trade amounts to one in each country’s 
aggregate trade. In calculating the GL index, individual observations on bilateral trade flows 
among countries are classified into two different data sets, the intra-industry and inter-industry 
sets. Some observations whose export and import values are identical are deemed to belong to 
the intra-industry trade set. Other observations whose export and import values are not 
identical are regarded as belong to the inter-industry trade set. The likelihood that a particular 
observation comes from intra-industry trade is inversely related to the absolute value of the 
                                                 
1  Specialization occurs because differences in factor proportions are larger than those in factor 
intensities of the goods produced.  4
difference between its exports and imports.2  If a particular observation passes such “selection” 
test, it is classified into the data set belonging to intra-industry trade and put into the formula as 
such. 
Focusing on the role of selectivity in the calculation of the intra-industry trade index, this 
paper contends that the sample selection probability provides an empirical justification for such 
an index. Sample selection by model presumes that the observed data of a specified model are 
not randomly selected, but are drawn from the population only when they satisfy certain 
selection criteria. For example, individual trade data are regarded as having been assigned to 
the two trade regimes by “self-selection” rather than by random assignment. The inter-industry 
trade data are drawn from the population only when comparative advantage prevails in 
determining the forms of trade flows. On the contrary, a sample of intra-industry trade will be 
drawn, if product differentiation with scale economies prevails in the selection process. Sample 
selection deals with a special form of the selectivity problem whose solution depends on the 
auxiliary model embedding selection criteria. So a priori information about the selection process 
is required: that is, how to partition the sample so that each of its elements may match up with 
the underlying regime, either comparative advantage or product differentiation with scale 
economies.3  The Heckman two-step procedure is useful to estimating such a model, in which a 
probit model is fitted first to a separation or a censoring indicator, and the estimated parameters 
are used to estimate the unconditional probability equation. This Heckman estimation method 
combines the two mutually exclusive trade regimes, using all the data. The sample selection 
probability that an observation is on the intra-industry trade equation or the inter-industry 
trade equation is calculated after the parameters of the selection model have been estimated. 
The average of sample selection probability that each trade flow data comes from inter-industry 
trade (or equivalently from intra-industry trade) can be regarded as an intra-industry trade 
index. 
The GL index can also be interpreted as a weighted average of selection probabilities that 
particular observations on trade flows come from the subpopulation to which the intra-industry 
trade model is applicable. With the whole population composed of the two exclusive 
subpopulations, this index can be referred to as the probability that the subpopulation of intra-
                                                 
2  The index is a weighted average whose weights are the differential shares in the total amount 
of bilateral exports and imports, the absolute differences divided by the total amount of 
bilateral trade. 
3  This sample selection model is equivalent to a switching regression model with the 
endogenous sample separation indicator. A switching regression with endogenous switching is 
equivalent to the disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation. See Maddala (1983, 
p302).  5
industry trade generates a particular sample of observations. What is characteristic of the GL 
index is that the selection criterion used in its calculation is the difference between exports and 
imports of each good. Under this criterion, the exporting or importing of a good is regarded as 
having been induced by the force of comparative advantage unless the difference between 
exports and imports of a certain good is zero. The GL index measures the extent of overlapped 
trade between trading partners as opposed to that of unilateral trade. 
This paper deals with a couple of related questions. The first one is whether the GL index is 
an appropriate indicator of the share of trade based on intra-industry trade. Given the 
equivalence between the GL index and the sample selection probability, it is questionable that 
the selection criterion of the GL index is appropriate. The selection criterion of the GL index is 
the existence of two-way trade. Yet this criterion, the absolute value of the difference between 
exports and imports, is not well founded on theoretical underpinnings or empirical justification. 
If a better selection criterion for separating intra-industry trade from inter-industry trade is 
available, the GL index can be improved upon as a more relevant indicator of intra-industry 
trade. 
The second question is whether it is possible to infer a transition in trade patterns from the 
evolution of the regime selection probability. Observations on trade flows are not likely to fit 
well with a specified regression equation that is constant over the observation period. For 
example, as the export pattern of a particular sector changes, the volume of exports in that 
sector will be explained over time by two different regimes of the gravity equation: first by the 
conventional Heckscher-Ohlin regime and then by the monopolistic competition regime or vice 
versa. A switching regression model is appropriate for such study on a transition in trade 
patterns in which a shifting from comparative advantage to product differentiation occurs. A 
change in the regime selection probabilities may indicate that a transition in trade patterns is 
taking place in the sense that the bilateral trade flows have come to be better explained by 
product differentiation with scale economies than by comparative advantage or vice versa. 
With these objectives and aims, this paper proposes a model based on the gravity equation to 
show how each country’s export flows can be explained simultaneously by comparative 
advantage and industrial organization, using the data from Korea and Taiwan. The model 
draws on the two different sets of explanatory variables in assessing the magnitude of bilateral 
trade flows, specific to comparative advantage and product differentiation with scale economies. 
Then the two-stage estimation methods are used to derive the sample selection (regime 
selection) probability. The comparison of the sample selection probability with the GL index 
will reveal how they are correlated with each other among various commodity groups. 
Moreover, since the GL index indicates the degree to which trade flows are determined by 
product differentiation with scale economies, the change in the magnitude of the GL index will  6
show how a transition in export performance occurs over time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, a brief summary is given on the 
usefulness of the GL index as a measure of intra-industry trade. In Section III, a sample selection 
model based on two versions of gravity equations, each of which is generated from the 
underlying trade models, is presented. Unlike the switching regression model of Section III 
which assumes that all trade is either inter-industry or intra-industry, but not both, the intra-
industry trade index of Section II takes a more practical approach, which assumes that some 
trade is intra-industry and other trade inter-industry. A short discussion on the compilation of 
the data set is given in Section IV. Estimation results based on the data of Korea and Taiwan are 
reported along with the corresponding GL indices in Section V. Interpretations and implications 
are summarized in Section VI and a conclusion is provided in Section VII. 
 
II. The Grubel-Lloyd Index 
 
An increase in the volume of trade can be caused either by changes in the pattern of 
comparative advantage (inter-industry trade) or by increasing product differentiation with scale 
economies (intra-industry trade). With many economies in the world following different paths 
of industrialization, it is likely that at certain point of time they specialize in different export 
items in accordance with what their comparative advantage dictates. However, it is also likely 
that, with “convergence” in their income level, trade patterns become increasingly 
complementary among the economies that compete with one another in similar export items. 
Trade due to product differentiation with increasing returns to scale (IRS) plays an important 
role in explaining trade between countries particularly when the differences in factor 
proportions are not very large. So any measure of intra-industry trade (or inter-industry trade) 
must somehow reflect how these two alternative forms of trade are combined to generate the 
actual trade data.   
The GL index is a standard indicator of measuring the share of intra-industry trade from a 
data set composed of both homogeneous and differentiated goods.4 This index is calculated 
from the share of intra-industry trade in total trade. It measures the degree of intra-industry 
trade due to product differentiation with scale economies, which indicates how a country 
import and export simultaneously varieties of a particular product. Expressed as the ratio of 
intra-industry trade (two-way trade within industries) to total trade (sum of intra-industry 
trade and inter-industry trade), the GL index can be defined as 
                                                 
4  Since the inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade indices sum to one, the former can be 





























The index, ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤
ij ij GL GL , will be equal to zero in the absence of intra-industry trade, but to 
one in the absence of inter-industry trade. Thus, if the bilateral GL index is relatively large for a 
set of trade flow data, it can be inferred that a relatively large proportion of bilateral trade in 
this data set is associated with two-way trade in differentiated products.5 
Yet this index is not a perfect indicator of measuring the share of trade due to product 
differentiation with scale economies. Its magnitude depends not only on the level of 
aggregation, but also on the method of industry classification. Moreover, since increasing 
returns to scale would not necessarily make a distinction between inter-industry trade and 
intra-industry trade, the GL index is inevitably prone to have a bias in its calculation.6 The 
more fundamental problem with the GL index, however, is that this index lacks theoretical 
foundations or empirical regularities. Apparently since Helpman (1987) established a formal 
link between data and theory, there have been similar lines of empirical works. Most empirical 
works have examined the index in light of the determinants of intra-industry trade. Since the 
index is not posited on a formal theory, the most the empirical works can do is to relate it to 
country characteristics for given industries or industry characteristics within each country.7 
In the calculation of the GL index, a particular observation on bilateral trade is regarded as 
belonging to intra-industry trade if the difference between the bilateral exports and imports is 
zero, but as belonging to inter-industry trade if that difference is greater than zero in absolute 
value. If a particular observation satisfies this “selection” criterion for intra-industry trade, it is 
put into the formula for calculating the GL index. This method is equivalent to calculating the 
weighted selection “probability.” That is, a certain observation is given probability one when it 
satisfies the selection criterion of the GL index. Then the number of probability one observations 
in the sample is counted, and the weighted sum of them, whose weights are the ratios of (intra-
industry) exports or imports to total trade, is calculated. The GL index thus calculated is 
nothing but the weighted sum of probabilities that particular observations are in the intra-
industry regime. This weighted sum is proportional to the ratio of probability one observations 
to all the observation in the sample. What this implies is that calculating the intra-industry trade 
index is comparable to estimating the regime selection probability by which each of the two 
                                                 
5  Grubel and Lloyd (1975) 
6  Evenett and Keller (2002, p288) and Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p1376) discuss the problems 
associated with using the GL index as an indicator of the measurement of trade due to IRS. 
7  See Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) for more information 
about the related literature.  8
versions of the gravity equation is selected. For example, if the share of intra-industry trade 
increases, the regime selection probability gets higher in favor of the monopolistic competition 
regime. In this regard, as a measurement of intra-industry trade, the GL index can be improved 
upon, since a more feasible selection criterion will bring about a better intra-industry trade 
index. 
In this paper, the comparability of the GL index with the regime selection probability is at 
issue. While the selection mechanism of the GL index lacks empirically plausible foundation, 
the sample selection does not. So this paper looks into the extent to which the GL index is 
correlated with the regime selection probability, an empirically verifiable concept.8 A high 
correlation between them will indirectly corroborate the usefulness of the GL index. The 
presumption is that although the GL index lacks empirical justification, the regime selection 
probability is robust to empirical regularities. Moreover, if this presumption can be justified, the 
validity of the conventional index can be enhanced by employing more plausible selection 
criteria, and an inference from the intra-industry trade index can be made about the information 
on structural transition in trade patterns. 
 
III. Regime Selection 
 
A. Two Versions of the Gravity Equation 
As the export pattern of a particular sector changes, the volume of exports in that sector can 
be explained over time by two different regimes of the gravity equation: first by a conventional 
Heckscher-Ohlin regime and then by a monopolistic competition regime or vice versa. If only 
comparative advantage matters, trade flows can be explained by the gravity equation based on 
a unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model with factor price equalization. On the other hand, if only 
product differentiation with scale economies matters, trade flows can be explained by the 
gravity equation based on a monopolistic competition model with complete specialization. Yet 
between these two extremes most observations on trade flows are likely to be explained partly 
by comparative advantage and partly by product differentiation with scale economies. The 
likelihood of observing these “in-between” observations can be constructed as the weighted 
sum of probabilities predicted from the two simplified models, which can be referred to as the 
sample selection probabilities. Moreover, if a transition had occurred in the export pattern, it 
should change the average of the sample selection probabilities, that is, the regime selection 
                                                 
8  So, unlike the previous studies, this paper does not consider the intra-industry trade index as 
a function of country characteristics or industry characteristics, nor does it try to explain the 
patterns of intra-industry trade in terms of those variables.  9
probability. This regime change causes the shifting of main explanatory power from the 
variables associated with comparative advantage to the other variables associated with product 
differentiation with scale economies. 
In the following, a two-country, two-good, and two-factor (2X2X2) model will be considered 
to establish the connection between the regime selection probability and the intra-industry 
trade index. Three variations of this model are possible. At one extreme, intra-industry trade 
may be ruled out, so that two homogenous goods are produced and traded in accordance with 
the patterns of comparative advantage. At the other extreme, all intra-industry trade in which 
two differentiated goods are produced and traded can be considered. Most of the time, however, 
a two-sector model with a homogenous good and a differentiated good is used to explain both 
intra-industry and inter-industry trade.   
Evenett and Keller (2002) provide a reference model that assumes balanced trade, no trade in 
intermediate goods, identical production technologies, and identical homothetic preferences. In 
the following, two extreme versions of a gravity equation will be constructed. One extreme 
version is the “unicone”9  Hecksher-Ohlin model laid out in Evenett and Keller (2002), which is 
appropriate for explaining trade flows due to comparative advantage. The other extreme 
version is the monopolistic competition model adapted from Hummels and Levinsohn (1995),10 
which is suitable for explaining trade flows due to product differentiation with scale economies. 
The mixed version with both homogeneous and differentiated goods can be constructed as a 
linear combination of these two extreme versions. 
 
B. A Unicone Heckscher-Ohlin Model with Factor-price Equalization 
Consider the unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model in which two countries diversify production 
and trade goods according to their comparative advantage. Suppose that country i has 
comparative advantage in good X . Then country i will ship good X to both countries, but it 
cannot export good Z to its trading partner. Analogously, suppose that country j has 
comparative advantage in goodZ . Country j will ship goodZ to both countries, but it cannot 
export good X to country i.  
Since both goods are homogeneous and are produced under constant-returns-to-scale 
technology, country i’s exports to country j are given by 
( ) ( ) 1
W i i
X
ij X s X p X − =  
                                                 
9  This is a model of two-country, two-good, and two-factor with factor price equalization, in 
which diversification of production occurs and the share of inter-industry trade increases with 
differences in factor proportions. Evenett and Keller (2002) call this model the “unicone” 
Heckscher-Ohlin model with CRS/CRS goods. 
10  Theirs basically follows Helpman and Krugman (1985).  10
where X p denotes the relative price of good X in terms of the numeraire good  Z 11,
i X country 
i’s production of good X ,





s = the country i’s share of 
world income,
i Y country i’s income, and
W Y world income.12  
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X θ θ − =  
where 
( ) j i θ is the share of the exportable good (import competing good) in country i(j)’s GDP.13 
The difference between 
i θ and 
j θ increases with an increase in the difference in the capital-
labor ratios between the two countries. This difference in GDP shares will tend to zero if factor 
proportions in the two countries converge. On the contrary, with the factor proportions 
substantially divergent enough to rule out factor price equalization, it will tend to one as the 
share of the exportable good in one of the two countries approaches one, whereas that in the 
other country approaches zero.14 If trade is dictated by comparative advantage alone, then 
equation (2) will make the appropriate gravity equation for explaining bilateral trade flows. 
In the presence of trade barriers (transport costs), on the other hand, equation (2) will be 
modified as follows.   







X θ θ − =  
To make equation (2’) operational, suppose that 
i θ corresponds to the share of the exportable 
good in the following domestic production possibility frontier, which gives the maximum 
combinations of X andZ .15 




i i i i i i Z X A Q − + =  
The first-order conditions of the transformation curve provide the equilibrium ratio of X toZ . 
That is, the ratio of  X toZ in country i is given by   
                                                 
11  Z is assumed to be the importable good. 
12  What this equation implies is that good X is capital intensive in production if country i is 
capital abundant or that good X is labor intensive in production if country i is labor abundant. 
13  Or it can be expressed as  ( )
w
j i i j
Y
Y Y θ θ −
  if the relative abundance of country i’s factor 
endowment is reversed. 
14  Evenett and Keller (2002, p286) 
15  The economy’s budget constraint, domestic expenditure valued at domestic prices, equals 



























ij T is the trade cost factor from country i to country j. Solving equation (4) for 
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Analogously, suppose that the foreign transformation function can be given as 
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The share of the import competing good in country j’s GDP, 
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θ into equations (5) and (7) 
and collecting terms will further simplify 
i θ and
j θ as functions of individual prices and trade 





















Since the world export and import prices are fixed for a small country, 
i θ decreases with
ji T , 
but
j θ increases with
ij T : the share of  X (exportable good) in GDP decreases in country i if the 
import price (the price of goodZ ) increases with the imposition of tariffs, and the share of 
X (import competing good) in GDP increases in country j if import price (the price of X ) 
increases with the imposition of tariffs. 
Given 
i θ and
j θ , it is convenient to express their difference  ( )
j i θ θ −   in terms of the price 
indices. The price indices corresponding to the respective transformation functions (equations 
(3) and (6)) can be expressed as 
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Substituting equations (5’) and (8’) into equations (9) and (10) respectively will yield the 
following relationships. 
( ) ( ) 11
ji i
X
i i T p k P + ∝  
( ) ( ) 12 1 + ∝
ij i
X
j j T p k P  
where 
i k and























θ θ . 
 
Estimation Equation 
Taking the log of equation (2’) gives the basic estimation equation as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( ) () 13 ln ln ln ln 3 2 1 ε θ θ α α α + − + + + =
j i j i j i ij S S Y Y X  





equation (2), which is equivalent to( )















The first term represents the effect of “market expansion.” The second term represents the “size 
dispersion” effect, which reflects the effects of IRS-based trade and is foreign to the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. The third term gets larger as differences in factor proportions between 
country i and country j increase. The term  ( )
j i θ θ −  is a function of trade costs and relative 
prices. Yet the gravity equation does not directly express the third term in those variables that 
make prices differ across countries, along with transport costs, tariffs, or exchange rate changes. 
Instead, the third term includes these trade costs only implicitly. 
  
C. A Monopolistic Competition Model with Complete Specialization 
In the monopolistic competition model, each producer chooses a variety and produces from 
an identical IRS production technology. Scale economies lead to specialization in every variety. 
While each variety can be regarded as a different product, competition among varieties dictates 
                                                 
16  With symmetrical trade costs,
ij ji T T = , the shares can be expressed in terms of trade cost 
and prices. That is,  ( )
i
X
ij i i p T P , , θ θ =  and ( )
i
X








= .  13
an identical price. Then the amount of each variety produced is the same, and the total output 
supply is equal to the number of varieties multiplied by the amount of each variety.17 All 
consumers are assumed to have identical preferences, so that their behavior can be inferred 
from that of a representative consumer. In free trade equilibrium with no transport costs, the 
output supply should equal the aggregate demand. 
Suppose that both X and Z are differentiated products, each of which comes in many 
varieties. Yet each country is assumed to produce only one product (variety) and ship it to both 
domestic and foreign markets. For example, country i’s exports to country j of the product in 
which country i is specializing can be expressed as
i j ij Y s X = in the absence of trade barriers, 
and country i’s shipments of that product to its own market can be expressed as 
i i ii Y s X = . 
Here
i s denotes country i’s share of world income, and






Y s X = = , 
where 
W Y , 
i Y , 
j Y denote the GDPs of the world, country i, country j respectively. 
In the presence of trade barriers (transport costs), however, it is more convenient to look at 




α α α Z X U + =  
subject to the budget constraint19  
( ) 16 Y Z X pX = + . 
Then the exports of country i to country j (the demand for country i good X in country j ) can be 
expressed as:   
                                                 
17  See Helpman and Krugman (1985, p 153), Chapter 7, for the derivation of the equilibrium 
values of the endogenous variables. 
18  The demand for each product variety can be derived as follows. Suppose that the utility 















i d U , where 1 0 < <α ,  d is the consumption level, and 
N  the number of varieties. From the indirect utility function, the demand function for each 




























i 1 where  ( ) α β − = 1 1  represents  the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties,  ()




k k p P   refers to a price index, and E is 
the amount of expenditure allocated to the consumption of the product as a whole. Again, if 
each variety commands the identical price, the quantity demanded of each variety is the same. 














Y X  
where  ( )
i ij ij p T p ≡  denotes the price in country j of the variety produced in country i, 
ij T  
trade costs or “barriers to trade,” and  ( ) α β − = 1 1 .  
Some modification of equation (17) is desirable for further operation.20 Since the GDP of 
country i can be expressed as 
() 18
























Y X X Y  
and the price of country i good for country j consumers as
i ij ij p T p = , the equilibrium prices 













































Y p . 
Substituting these prices into equation (17) yields   
() 20
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where  






































Moreover, substituting the equilibrium prices into the price index yields 












































p p P . 
If the trade barriers are symmetric,
ji ij T T = , as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it can be 
shown that
i i P Π = . Then equation (21) can be simplified as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22
1 1 1 1 1 j j jj i i ij j s P T s P T P
− − − − −
+ =
β β β β β
 
And equation (20) becomes   
                                                                                                                                               
the derivation of the gravity equation. 
20  The derivation of the following equations is based on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 



















The solution to this equation requires additional information on the trade cost factor,
ij T , which 
is supposed to include all the elements that impede cross-border trade such as transport costs, 
tariffs, and exchange rate changes. 
 
Estimation Equation 
  The estimation strategy is to construct the bilateral trade flow equation from the gravity 
equation derived above. The basic regression equation is expressed as 






+ + + = j i
ij
j i j i ij
P P
T
S S Y Y X 21 
The terms of equation (23) come from the corresponding terms in equation (20’), representing 





term in equation (20’) can be transformed into an equivalent term,  ( )
j i j i S S Y Y + . 
The trade cost term 
ij T  is one in the absence of trade barriers. Otherwise, the 
ij T term is 
assumed to be an increasing function of variables hindering trade flows across countries such as 
bilateral distance, exchange rate variations, and tariffs. The price index of each country 
() j i k P
k , = is a function of  bilateral trade barriers, in which each bilateral trade barrier is 
normalized by the exporting (supplying) country’s consumer price index before it is weighted 
by the exporting (supplying) country’s income share to calculate the importing country’s 
consumer price index. A larger price index implies a higher degree of “resistance,” meaning a 




term in equation (20’), the ratio of the 
bilateral trade costs to the product of consumer price indices, is supposed to capture the 
“product differentiation” effect, the degree of which depends on how similar the prices of these 
goods become. All goods are in effect differentiated by place of origin in the present model. The 
substitution possibility between these goods makes the price indices tend to become identical, 




  term also implies that 
trade between two countries is a function of the bilateral barrier between them relative to the 
                                                 
21  0 1 3 < − = β β , since  1 > β . 
22  See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p176) for discussion of the related concept.  16
product of average trade barriers that each country faces with its other trading partners. 
Relative trade barriers change the level of trade between the two countries. For example, larger 
i P and 
j P (average prices of goods imported from all countries) increase trade between 
country i and country j as these price indices reduce the relative price of goods imported from 
country i. 23 
 
D. Switching Regression with “Imperfect” Sample Separation 
It is not plausible to explain the patterns of actual trade flows exclusively on the basis of one 
particular version of the gravity equation: either explaining a given volume of trade solely by 
comparative advantage, or explaining trade flows solely by product differentiation with scale 
economies. A latent structure in which two versions of the gravity equation are embedded can 
generate the actual data in accordance with a sample selection mechanism.24 Even in this 
structure, however, an individual observation is applicable to only one of the two regimes, 
either intra-industry or inter-industry, with appropriate probability.25 If an observation in the 
sample crosses the threshold required by the sample selection criteria, the model associated 
with those criteria is observed, and the corresponding set of the independent variables that are 
associated with the underlying regime is selected. Yet, while each observation may come from 
either one of the two distinct regression models, the central tendency of the whole data set 
depends on the extent to which all the observations in the set satisfy the selection criteria on 
average. 
Suppose that the possible attributes of trade flow data can be represented by the two basic 
equations (13) and (23) and that the extent of intra-industry trade (or inter-industry trade) can 
be measured by the proportion of the observations attributable to product differentiation with 
scale economies (or comparative advantage). For example, suppose that, with probabilityΦ , a 
particular set of observations comes from the gravity equation posited on comparative 
advantage, that is, Regime 1 
( ) ( ) ( ) () 3 1 ln ln ln ln 1 3 2 1 1 ′ + − + + + = ε θ θ α α α
j i j i j i ij S S Y Y X . 
Analogously, with probability Φ − 1 , a given set of observations falls on the gravity equation 
                                                 
23  Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p176) 
24  Obviously, the dichotomous model identification is too simplistic. However, the extension of 
its results to a more general case is straightforward. 
25  This presumption is justifiable for a given practice of industry classification and aggregation 
used in constructing trade flow data. The current practice of industry classification puts many 
different products under the same category. But since it is difficult to relate unambiguously 
each observation to ether one of the two forms of trade regardless of the level of aggregation, 
the separation of inter-industry from intra-industry trade is often made arbitrarily.  17
posited on product differentiation with scale economies, that is, Regime 2 
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Note that  ( )
2
1 1 , 0 ~ σ ε N  and ( )
2
0 0 , 0 ~ σ ε N .  
Equations (13’) and (23’) can be combined to be estimated simultaneously. In that case, all the 
observations on
ij X can be used. The combined model is expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )() 24 0 Pr 0 | ln 1 Pr 1 | ln ln = = + = = = I I X E I I X E X E
ij ij ij  
Here the unconditional (incomplete data) density is described as26 
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Note thatΓ andΗ denote explanatory variables in equations (13) and (23) respectively,  1 = I  
Regime 1,  0 = I  Regime  2, () 1 Pr = = Φ I , and  ( ) 0 Pr 1 = = Φ − I . 
The determination on whether a certain observation comes from a particular regime is 
different from that on how much trade comes from that regime once the selection is made. As a 
result,α ’s andβ ’s in equation (24) should be estimated in two stages in which two different 
models are used: the univariate probit model and then the sample selection model. 
In the first stage, a binomial probit model is estimated. The model is expressed as 
[]( ) 1 1 Pr = ′ Φ = = I z I γ if  ε γ ≥ ′ = z I
*  
[] ( ) 0 1 0 Pr = ′ Φ − = = I z I γ if ε γ < ′ = z I
*  
What this model implies is as follows: if ε ≥
* I , an observation on export flows is better 
explained by comparative advantage, and otherwise, it is better explained by economies of scale 
with product differentiation. The residual termε is assumed to have a normal distribution with 
mean 0 and variance 1, and  z I γ′ =
* is a sample separation indicator27  that separates the export 
flow based on comparative advantage from that based on scale economies with product 
differentiation. The problem with the probit model is that the sample separation indicator, 
() z I γ′ =
* , is not observable, and neither are the factors causing exports from a certain country 
to its trading partners. Thus a dichotomous variableI , a counterpart for
* I , has to be devised to 
indicate whether
* I crosses a threshold.   
                                                 
26  Maddala (1983, p 299), Quandt (1988, p 54) 
27  Lee and Porter (1984) name it an imperfect criterion function. Maddala (1983, p 302) calls this 
kind of model a switching regression model with endogenous switching.    18
  The sample separation indicator equals one if one of the three conditions for inter-industry 
trade28 is satisfied. The first condition refers to the relationship between relative production 
shares and comparative advantage. In the pure comparative advantage model, exporting is 
expected when the difference between the production vector and the consumption vector is 
positive. For example, compare the ratio of the exportable to the importable in country i (the 
exporting country) and the ratio of the importable to the exportable in country j (the importing 
country).If the difference between them is positive (negative) and country i (the exporting 
country) is capital (labor) abundant, the corresponding observation on export flows belongs to 
Regime 1 (based on comparative advantage). More specifically, suppose that a certain 




































































Then that observation is regarded as having come from Regime 1. The second condition, which 
is applicable when the first condition fails, gives one to the sample separation indicator one if 
the amount of exports is zero. Observations with zero values for
ij X belong to Regime 1 as they 
represent complete inter-industry specialization, since with intra-industry trade neither exports 
nor imports can be zero. The third condition, which is applicable to the “mixture” model where 
the first two conditions are not satisfied, compares the amount of production and that of 
consumption in the exportable good sector. In the mixture model, if the homogeneous good is 
to be exported, the amount of exportable good production must exceed the amount of its 
consumption. Consequently, if a certain observation satisfies none of these three conditions, it is 
                                                 
28  The first two conditions are applied to the pure Heckscher-Ohlin model. The third condition 
for inter-industry trade pertains to the “hybrid” model, in which the differentiated good is 
produced by capital intensive technology. By definition, inter-industry trade is ruled out in the 
monopolistic competition model. 
29  To see what this implies, compare the “production parallelogram” with the “consumption 
parallelogram” in the simple (2X2X2) “integrated economy” diagram depicted in Dixit and 
Norman (1980). If the value added share of this country’s exports in its GDP is 
i θ in the 
(2X2X2) model, its share of importable goods is( )
i θ − 1 . If country i’s exportable good is capital 
intensive, this country must be capital abundant. Since country j’s importable good is country 
i’s exportable good,
j θ is the share of country j’s importable goods production in its GDP. With 
the assumption of homothetic preferences across countries, if exporting based on comparative 



















. On the other hand, if country i’s 




















regarded as coming from Regime 2.30   
The first stage model generates
* I . The criterion function (an index function) for “choosing” 
one from the two trade generating mechanisms (comparative advantage or scale economies 
with product differentiation) involves such variables as the differences in the capital-labor 
ratios and the number of varieties locally supplied relative to the total number of varieties 
demanded by the trading partners. The former represents the relative strength of comparative 
advantage or Regime 1, and the latter represents the strength of scale economies with product 
differentiation or Regime 2. 
In the second stage, after the regime selection probability is determined, both Regime 1 and 
Regime 2 are simultaneously estimated for nonlimit observations. The combined equation is 
expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' 24 1 ln 0 1 0 1 φ σ σ β α ε ε − + Φ − ′ + Φ ′ = x x X E
ij  
HereΦ,φ , ε σ0 , and ε σ1 denote the cumulative distribution function, the probability density 
function, and the covariance functions respectively. Regressing the dependent variable 
ij X ln on the exogenous variables Φ ˆ
1 x , ( ) Φ − ˆ 1 0 x , and φ ˆwill yield estimates of α′,β′ and 
() ε ε σ σ 0 1 − . The variables that are included in both regimes must have identical coefficients.   
 
IV. The Data 
 
Data have been taken from various sources such as World Economic Outlook 2002, International 
Financial Statistics, World International Trade Statistics, and the Penn World Table 5.6 and 6.1. The 
bilateral export flows
ij X are from the World Bank Trade and Production Database for 67 countries 
over the period 1976-99. Each country’s data set covers different time periods: the end year is 
1999, but the beginning year is different. The panel data sets are not balanced. Moreover, the 
number of observations for each country does not always equal the product of time periods and 
the number of its trading partners due to omissions. The bilateral export flows 
ij X  are 
reported in current U.S. dollars at three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) industries (28 industries), and are available for 67 countries. The World Bank Trade and 
Production Database also contains data on value added, which are used to calculate the share of 
exportable good production in each country’s GDP. The IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
                                                 
30  If a homogeneous goods model works at all, a differentiated goods model must stop working 
and vice versa. In a switching regression model, an observation on export flows may come from 
either comparative advantage or scale economies, but not from both.  20
2002 provides data on cross-country differences in the price levels with its base in 1985 and on 
gross domestic product in U.S. dollars. The Penn World Table version 5.6 is the source of data on 
capital-labor ratios() L K .31 Jon  Haveman’s  Useful Gravity Model Data set provides the bilateral 
distance between the capital cities measured in kilometers (DISTANCE), which proxies 
transportation costs, the ratio of c.i.f.(cost, insurance and freight) to f.o.b.(free on board). Table 1 
presents averages of the explanatory variables used in the model. 
Table 1 
The number of varieties produced in country j  ( )
j
X
j j p q Y N = is a hypothetical construct to 
be put into the probit equation as an explanatory variable. It is defined as the ratio of country j 
GDP to the value of a typical differentiated good produced in country j. A large value for this 
number relative to the total number of tradable varieties in the world implies that country j can 
sufficiently satisfy its demand for differentiated goods from the local suppliers. The number of 
local varieties will increase with the value of GDP in country j and decrease with the value of 
the equilibrium quantity,
j
X p q , of the “supposedly identical” differentiated goods. The larger 
the number of varieties locally produced, the smaller is the demand for intra-industry imports. 
The total value-added of each three-digit ISIC industry in the World Bank Trade and Production 
Data Set is used as a proxy for the value of equilibrium quantity demanded for a typical 
differentiated good, 
j
X p q . In the monopolistic competition model with the identical country 
size, the amount of each variety produced in each country should be identical. Also, with 
identical homothetic preferences, the amount of each variety demanded should be identical if 
each country’s income is identical.32  However, according to the World Bank Trade and Production 
Data Set, the value-added per firm even within the same industry is far from being identical 
across countries. There are two possible explanations for this anomaly. First, unlike in a 
theoretical model, those countries in the data set are not identical in terms of their country size, 
factor endowments, and so forth. So the quantity supplied by each firm need not be identical 
across countries. Second, in a model of symmetrical countries, the share of each variety 
produced and exported in each country should be identical. Yet, in reality, the demand for each 
variety in every country is met by both domestic production and imports, so their production 
shares do not have to be symmetrical across countries. Since the value-added per firm in the 
data set accounts for domestic production only, the country with a smaller value-added per 
firm may have to import differentiated goods proportionally more than the country with a 
                                                 
31  Capital stock per worker in 1985 international prices is available only until 1992. Capital stock 
data have to be extrapolated from the past data set. For that purpose, the GDP data set has been 
used as an independent variable. 
32  The amount of each variety demanded is less than the amount of each variety produced in 
each country.  21
larger value-added per firm in order to satisfy the condition that the demand for each variety is 
identical across countries. In that case, the value-added per firm for a smaller country can be 
less than that of a larger country. 
 
V. Empirical Results: Evidence from the Experiences of Korea and Taiwan 
 
A. The Grubel-Lloyd Indices 
The bilateral GL indices are calculated from the data on all manufactured goods traded at the 
four-digit and three-digit SITC for country pairs with positive amounts of trade. Each of these 
countries has up to 66 bilateral trade relations against its respective trading partners, and each 
of them buys up to 82 four-digit SITC or 28 three-digit items from every economy in the data set. 
The time period of the bilateral data sets ranges from nineteen to twenty four years. 
The average GL indices for Korea and Taiwan against each of their respective trading 
partners are given in Table 2 for the period of 1976-1999. The indices based on three-digit 
classification are larger than those based on four-digit classification. Obviously, the level of 
aggregation significantly influences the magnitude of the indices. The number of trading 
partners in the data set also influences the magnitude of the GL indices. For example, compared 
with those indices calculated by Evenett and Keller (2002) for the group of 58 countries in the 
year 1985, the indices for Korea and Taiwan based on 51 and 49 countries are much larger. The 
GL indices for Taiwan and Korea in Evenett and Keller (2002) are 0.0569 and 0.0644 respectively, 
but the same indices calculated at the four-digit level in this paper are 0.099 and 0.113 
respectively as shown in Table 2.33  
Table 2 
The GL index measures the extent of intra-industry trade as an indicator of trade due to 
product differentiation with scale economies. The high values of the GL index imply that 
product differentiation and economies of scale play a more influential role than comparative 
advantage in explaining the pattern of trade, while the low values imply the other way around. 
Yet, as many researchers have pointed out, inconsistency in industrial classification and the 
presence of intermediate goods trade may inhibit the exact measuring of the trade shares 
attributable to product differentiation with scale economies.34 
 
B. Model Estimates 
                                                 
33  Yet direct comparison is not warranted, because not only the number of countries and their 
composition, but also the coverage of industries is different between the two data sets. 
34  Evenett and Keller (2002, p288)  22
The sample selection probability is less susceptible to arbitrariness. It relates each observation 
to one of the two trade flow generating mechanisms, either comparative advantage or product 
differentiation with scale economies. The sample selection probability is estimated from a 
sample selection model35 using all the possible bilateral export relations among the trading 
partners by two stage least squares with the constant term. Thirty-four sets of cross-section data 
are used: for each of the two countries (Korea and Taiwan), seventeen sets of data (1976-1992) 
are chosen.   
All the estimated coefficients of the probit equation are consistent with theory and are 
statistically significant at less than 1 percent level. Two explanatory variables enter the probit 
equation: product differentiation and factor proportions. Positive signs on the ‘relative’ variety 
term,
W j N N ,36 bear out theoretical expectations. The extent of intra-industry trade shrinks if 
the demand for differentiated goods met by local suppliers becomes larger. Thus the likelihood 
of a certain observation to come from the comparative advantage regime increases with the 
capabilities of local producers to meet the local demand for differentiated goods. Conversely, a 
decrease in their capabilities will increase the extent of potential intra-industry trade and reduce 
that of inter-industry trade. Similarly, regarding the extent of comparative advantage, positive 
signs on the relative capital-labor ratio,( ) ( )
i i j j L K L K , are also consistent with theory. Inter-
industry trade is more likely to be observed if the difference in factor proportions between the 
trading partners increases. Coefficients of both terms are volatile for Korea, but relatively stable 
for Taiwan. The ratio of the partial effects for  ( )
W j N N  and ( )IJ L K terms for both Korea 
and Taiwan remained above one except for 76-78 (Korea) and 76-77 (Taiwan), implying that the 
role of product differentiation was greater that of comparative advantage in explaining the 
likelihood of inter-industry trade.  That is, the positive effect of factor proportions on the 
probability of inter-industry is more than fully eclipsed by the negative effect of product 
differentiation. One implication of this is that the inter-industry trade becomes less important 
than intra-industry trade in explaining the increase in trade flows. (See table 3-A,B.) 
Transition probabilities p11 and p01 denote conditional probabilities [] 1 | 1 Pr = = I w  and 
[] 0 | 1 Pr = = I w  respectively  wherew is a dichotomous indicator or a measure ofI with error. 
The transition probability p11 for Korea ranges from 0.964(1991) to 1.000(1976), meaning thatw , 
the measure of I , represents correctly the dichotomous variable I ninety-six to a hundred 
percent of the data points. The transition probability p11 for Taiwan ranges from 0.945(1977) to 
                                                 
35  The sample selection model is equivalent to the switching regression model with imperfect 









i j i W p q p q Y Y N + + = 2   23
0.983(1979). On the other hand, the transition probability p01 indicates the probability 
thatw misrepresents the dichotomous variable I as in “regime 1” when the latter is indeed in 
“regime 2.” The transition probability p01 for Korea ranges from 0.271(1988) to 0.520(1984), 
while that for Taiwan from 0.276(1992) to 0.625(1982). What these numbers imply is that the 
probability of misclassifying an observation from regime 2 into one from regime 1 is substantial: 
the average probability of misclassification is 0.433 for Korea and 0.423 for Taiwan. The present 
sample selection model performs well in classifying data from regime 1 correctly, but it does 
not when it comes to classifying data from regime 2. The overall probability of correct 
prediction is a weighted average of the probability correctly predicted for regime 1 and the 
percent correctly predicted for regime 2. The overall probability that the predicted value 
matches the actual value is 0.923 for Korea and 0.895 for Taiwan respectively. 
The coefficients of the combined equation estimated in the second stage are consistent with 
what theory stipulates. Coefficients of the combined market effect  ( )
j i Y Y +  for Korea range 
from 1.99 (1979) to 2.86 (1976), implying that exports elastically respond to market expansion. 
For Taiwan, they range from 1.43 (1979) to 2.19 (1976). However, if theory is correct, these 
coefficients should approach one. In this regard, the combined market effect (or the market 
expansion effect) term may have been overestimated. Overestimation is apparently more 
serious for Korea (average 2.34) than for Taiwan (average 1.76). 
Coefficients of the “size dispersion” effect term  ( )
j iS S   are expected to be smaller than those 
on the market expansion effect term. Unlike the market expansion effect, the size dispersion 
effect is supposed to be absent in the exchange of diversified homogeneous goods. So the 
weighted average of the size dispersion effects associated with the two different regimes must 
be smaller than the size dispersion effect associated with the product differentiation regime 
alone. For both Korea and Taiwan, the coefficients of the size dispersion effect term are indeed 
less than those of the combined market effect (or the market expansion effect) term. 
The comparative advantage term,( )
j i θ θ − , has negative coefficients, which range from -0.60 
(1992) to -1.93 (1976) for Korea and from -0.43 (1979) to -1.41 (1976) for Taiwan. Yet 1979 result 
for Taiwan is not statistically significant. The negative sign of the comparative advantage term 
implies that export growth diminishes as comparative advantage improves. This seemingly 
inconsistent outcome needs further explanation. In the presence of the product differentiation 
term, the influence of comparative advantage on exports cannot be independently determined. 
If comparative advantage improves, those sectors specializing in affected goods will want to 
increase their exports. If the exports of comparative advantage goods are to increase, these 
sectors have to snatch resources away from the other activities. For example, resources that 
might have gone to differentiated goods production must be reallocated to homogeneous goods. 
If that happens, the exporting of differentiated goods may be reduced down to such an extent  24
that the reduction in differentiated goods export may exceed the increase in homogenous goods 
export, and the net amount of exports is actually decreased. The negative comparative 
advantage term implies that this conjecture might be the case. On average, the reduction in 
export growth in response to changes in comparative advantage is slightly more elastic in Korea 
(-1.07) than in Taiwan (-0.80). As both Korea and Taiwan continue to deepen their capital-labor 
ratios, they seem to have been able to make their respective industrial structure more suitable 
for differentiated goods production. As a result, the negative impact of expanding inter-
industry trade has been moderated. 
The negative sign on the comparative advantage term is consistent with the prediction of 
Evenett and Keller (2002, p287) that the bilateral volume of exports (imports) increases with the 
extent of product differentiation. In the perfectly specializing product differentiation model, 
bilateral exports (imports) are proportional to the product of GDPs as shown in equation (14). In 
the unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model, however, bilateral exports (imports) are less than 
proportional to this product as shown in equation (2). The fact that the comparative advantage 
term becomes larger means a change in the composition of two forces, product differentiation 
and comparative advantage, in favor of comparative advantage. The increase in the importance 
of comparative advantage relative to product differentiation means the trade share explained 
by the former becomes larger, so that the volume of trade that is a weighted average of trade 
explained by both forces should decline.   




, is consistent with 
theoretical expectations.37 With a negative coefficient, exports will increase if the product of 
prices indices increases. The degree of product differentiation depends on how similar the 
prices of these goods are. Moreover, the more similar the price indices are, the greater their 
product becomes. The similarity of price indices will therefore enhance export growth due to 
increased product differentiation. Unlike the case with the negative comparative advantage 
term, reallocation to differentiated goods production should not reduce the total amount of 
exports. Scale economies due to an increase in differentiated goods production preclude the 
actual reduction in export growth.   
Apparently, comparing the coefficients of the comparative advantage and product 
differentiation terms shows that the product differentiation term is relatively more important to 
Taiwan in explaining the export growth than to Korea. The coefficient of the product 
differentiation term is always greater than that of the comparative advantage term in absolute 
value for Taiwan except the years 1976 and 1991. Yet it is not the case for Korea until the year 
                                                 
37 Since β β − =1 5 ,  0 5 < β  implies  that 1 > β , which is what theory presumes.  25
1982 provided that the case of the year 1979 is ruled out. 
Coefficients of the probability density function term, ( ) z γ φ ′ , and the inverse Mills ratio (the 








= , can be calculated. The coefficient of the estimated probability density 
term,φ ˆ, is the estimate of  () ε ε σ σ 0 1 − , which ranges from -0.186(1979) to 0.529 (1976) for Korea 
and from -0.196 (1977) to 0.187 (1984) for Taiwan.38 Yet the estimates of  φ ˆ are not statistically 
significant except for the years 1976, 1978, and 1983 for Korea and 1978 for Taiwan.39   
Table 3 
C. Sample Selection Probabilities 
The regime selection probability that each observation is on Regime 1 (or on Regime 2) is 
calculated from the estimated parameters of the model. Its average is reported in Table 4 on the 
row showing the values ofΦ. As for Korea, the average selection probability for Regime 1,Φ, 
ranges from 0.797 (1991) to 0.946 (1976), which implies that the selection probability for Regime 
2, the supposed extent of intra-industry trade, ranges from 0.054 to 0.203. The extent of intra-
industry trade inferred from the sample selection model is less than that assessed from the GL 
index. It approaches only 87.7 percent of the GL index on average during the sample period, 
which is an underestimation of the GL index by 12.3 percent. In case of Taiwan, however, an 
overestimation is the case. Taiwan’s selection probability for Regime 2 ranges from 0.120 (1976) 
to 0.261 (1991), and its GL index ranges from 0.09 (1977) to 0.200 (1992). The sample selection 
model overestimates the GL index by 16.3 percent.   
Table 4 
Besides the discrepancy between the regime selection probability and the GL index, different 
correlations between them also are characteristic of the experiences of Korea and Taiwan. While 
the correlation coefficient is relatively high for Korea, it is not so for Taiwan. The correlation 
coefficients are 0.894 (Korea) and 0.622 (Taiwan) respectively. Apparently, a stronger linear 
relationship between the regime selection probability and the GL index exists in case of Korea. 
What has caused these imbalances in the indices and the correlation coefficients? Three 
factors seem to be at work. The first factor is the discrepancy in the number of observations. For 
both Korea and Taiwan, the data points plugged into the formula in the calculation of the GL 
index are always greater than those used in the estimation of the sample selection model.40 The 
                                                 
38  The estimates ofφ ˆ  are not reported in Table 2. 
39  They are significant at the 5 percent level. 
40  Compare the numbers at 3-digits in Table 2 with those in Table 1.  26
GL index can be calculated for any country pairs exchanging positive amount of trade. On the 
other hand, the sample selection model needs a balanced-set of explanatory variables before it 
can be estimated. Thus, unlike in the case of the GL index, the availability of trade data is not 
sufficient for the selection model to be estimated. The information about capital per worker and 
industry value-added is so indispensable elements that it actually plays a crucial role in 
determining the availability of the relevant data-set. The second factor is related to the 
treatment of the zero values of trade. When the amount of exports (imports) is zero, it does not 
influence the magnitude of the GL index. Zero values do not enter the formula. In case of the 
sample selection model, however, zero amounts make difference to the extent of intra-industry 
trade, since they are classified into the inter-industry trade regime. One related point to the 
second factor is the fact that in the calculation of the GL index both exports and imports data 
are needed. Yet in the estimation of the sample selection model either import or export data, but 
not both, are required. The third factor is the performance of the separation indicator used, 
which can be inferred from the transition probabilities in Table 3. When it comes to the 
separation of observations associated with inter-industry trade, the separation indicator used in 
the present model performs satisfactorily. This indicator, however, is not so good at identifying 
intra-industry trade observations when these data are actually from the intra-industry trade 
regime. It is not easy to see what impacts the inequality in the number of observations, the 
different treatment of zero values, and the performance of the separation indicator have made 
on the regime selection probability. Yet the discrepancy between the GL indices and regime 
selection probabilities or that in the correlation coefficients between Korea and Taiwan would 




A. Regime Selection Probabilities and Intra-industry Trade Indices 
With only a few supporting cases in hand, one cannot make even a cautious generalization on 
the relationship between the regime selection probabilities and intra-industry trade indices. Yet, 
however scant evidence the above analysis provides, the way the model is set up is rigorous 
enough to justify choosing the regime selection probability in preference to the intra-industry 
trade index. The regime selection model combines two contrasting sub-models. The gravity 
equation constitutes the foundation on which these two sub-models for explaining bilateral 
trade flows are built. The first sub-model comes from Evenett and Keller (2002),41 a unicone 
                                                 
41  They are IRS-based perfect specialization (IRS/IRS Goods), IRS-unicone Heckscher-Ohlin-
based imperfect specialization (IRS/CRS Goods), multicone Heckscher-Ohlin-based perfect  27
Heckscher-Ohlin model with two goods produced by constant returns to scale (CRS) 
technology, and the second one is a monopolistic competition model with two goods produced 
by increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology. The Heckscher-Ohlin model does not allow 
perfect specialization in the production of goods with factor price equalization. The 
monopolistic competition model allows perfect specialization in each variety of differentiated 
goods. These two sub-models are combined to expand three trade models,42 so that every 
observation on bilateral trade flows can be regarded as having come from any one of them. 
Then the selection probability determines whether a certain observation belongs to the 
comparative advantage sub-model or the product differentiation sub-model. 
Obviously, the regime selection probability is not identical to the GL index. Yet, the regime 
selection probability may replace the GL index as an appropriate indicator to assess the extent 
of intra-industry trade. The regime selection probability can be empirically justified, but the GL 
index lacks both theoretical and empirical justification. In the calculation of the GL index, its 
selection criterion posits on the condition that the absolute value of the difference between 
exports and imports is not zero. The GL selection criterion only makes sure that there is two-
way trade in the bilateral trade flows. This criterion is not well founded on theory and lacks 
empirical regularities. On the other hand, the regime selection probability is a more relevant 
method to separate intra-industry trade from inter-industry trade, and it will make a better 
indicator of intra-industry trade. The sample selection probability can improve upon the GL 
index. 
The modeling method of this paper follows common practice in the literature, assuming 
perfect specialization for product differentiation with scale economies, but imperfect 
specialization for Heckscher-Ohlin type comparative advantage. In contrast, Evenett and Keller 
(2002) arbitrarily separate the “low-Grubel-Lloyd” sample from the “high-Grubel-Lloyd” 
sample and classify each sample into five sub-groups according to the level of product 
differentiation or differences in factor proportions. They show that both the multicone 
Heckscher-Ohlin model (that is, without factor price equalization) and the scale economies 
model with perfect specialization grossly over-predict the level of bilateral trade flows across 
countries. In so doing, they reject the feasibility of perfect specialization versions for the reason 
of over-prediction, and find evidence in support of the imperfect specialization versions, 
                                                                                                                                               
specialization (CRS/CRS Goods), and unicone Heckscher-Ohlin-based imperfect specialization 
(CRS/CRS) models. The first two belong to the “high Grubel-Lloyd” sample and the remaining 
two to the “low Grubel-Lloyd” sample. 
42  They are two-homogeneous-goods-model (comparative advantage model), homogeneous-
and-differentiated-goods-model (comparative advantage / product differentiation model), and 
two-differentiated-goods-model (product differentiation model).  28
namely the IRS / unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model and the unicone Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
 
B. Transition from Comparative Advantage to Product Differentiation 
Some authors have looked at the changes in the GL index to infer transition in trade 
patterns.43  Provided that the equivalence between the GL index and the selection probability is 
secured, one can infer transition in trade patterns from the changes in the regime selection 
probability. A regression equation that is constant over the observation period does not fit well 
with data on trade flows over time. If the export pattern of a particular sector changes, the 
volume of exports in that sector cannot be explained by a model that remains constant over time. 
Two different regimes of the gravity equation that have been used to measure the extent of 
intra-industry trade can be used to ascertain the existence of transition in export patterns from 
the one based on comparative advantage to the other based on product differentiation with 
scale economies. A switching regression model is appropriate for such study on transition in 
trade patterns in which a shifting from comparative advantage to product differentiation occurs. 
A change in the regime selection probability indicates that a transition in trade patterns is 
taking place in the sense that the bilateral trade flows have come to be better explained by 
product differentiation with scale economies than by comparative advantage. 
The product differentiation with scale economies and comparative advantage terms should 
be inversely related to each other in explaining bilateral trade flows, consider the following.44 
While an increase in the demand for variety in the foreign country is likely to increase exports, 
an increase in production costs (exporter’s price) reduces exports. The larger the equilibrium 
number of varieties is, the lower is the price of each variety. If the size of the market becomes 
larger, the number of varieties that can be produced increases. However, the net increase in the 
number of varieties due to market expansion in a country with a larger local market is less than 
that in a smaller one, because the former has already been producing more varieties than the 
latter. As a result, the larger the number of locally produced varieties is, the smaller is the 
additional reduction in the local equilibrium price. If imports due to product differentiation in a 
larger market decrease, then imports due to comparative advantage (relative price differences) 
will increase. Or, if the force of “product-differentiation-based” trade prevails, the force of 
“comparative-advantage-based” trade will diminish. Since these two forces are to work in the 
opposite direction, trade due to comparative advantage should get smaller when trade due to 
product differentiation prevails. 
 
                                                 
43  See for example Rodrik (1994) and Scitovsky (1986). 
44  This does not mean their coefficients should have opposite signs. See V. C. for the reason why.  29
VII. Conclusion 
 
  This paper suggests that the GL index can be interpreted as a regime selection probability. 
For a given set of bilateral trade flow data, the GL index is equivalent to a trade-weighted 
average of “selection probabilities” by which any actual observation on trade flows is attributed 
either to comparative advantage or to product differentiation with scale economies. The reason 
why the GL index must be equivalent to the weighted average of selection probabilities is that it 
posits on the similar selection mechanism as found in the usual sample selection model. 
According to sample selection, the regime selection probability can be obtained as an average of 
sample selection probabilities that combine hypothetically distinctive trade regimes to replicate 
the actual data. It interprets a given set of observations on trade flows as a construct composed 
of mixed inter-industry and intra-industry trade elements. 
The sample selection probabilities are affected by the level of aggregation in classifying the 
product groups or categorizing the industries. At one extreme where the degree of aggregation 
is “too low,” the magnitude of intra-industry trade based on scale economies is likely to be 
small, but pure inter-industry trade based on comparative advantage is likely to be large. At the 
other extreme where the level of aggregation is “too high” so that all the “oranges and apples” 
are classified under the same category, the extent of inter-industry trade will decrease, leading 
to greater intra-industry trade. Any observation on export flows is not “pure” in the sense that 
both of these trade regimes present themselves in causing the observation of those data. Besides 
the level of aggregation, the selection criterion plays a crucial role in determining the value of 
the intra-industry trade index. If a different criterion other than the difference between exports 
and imports is adopted, the GL index will change accordingly. The selection criterion used in 
this paper stipulates three conditions under which a particular observation is classified as 
coming from the inter-industry trade regime. A dichotomous variable is employed as a sample 
separation indicator that equals one if the conditions for inter-industry trade are satisfied and 
zero otherwise. 
This paper justifies estimating the extent of intra-industry trade with the sample selection 
model or the switching regression model. Two points can be called forth for its justification. 
First of all, this method accords well with theoretical foundations and provides empirical 
robustness, so that the average regime selection probability thus estimated will serve as a more 
relevant indicator of intra-industry trade. Second, it can provide information on transition in 
trade patterns, since a change in the average regime selection probability may indicate a 
transition in trade patterns in which a shifting of explanatory power from comparative 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 










i θ  














1976  14 249  7398  0.036 0.036 28921000 92312076 5989  48.53 92.48 20452  7105
1977  18 332  7453  0.036 0.036 37077000 105598807 6329  53.44 85.02 18392  7770
1978  29 582  15036  0.036 0.036 50069000 257436931 8212  61.47 91.09 20110  8207
1979  37 723  14557  0.036 0.036 64124000 245064617 8483  68.38 90.64 19818  8950
1980  39 694  16110  0.036 0.036 62210000 289005248 8180  63.88 94.79 20823  9759
1981  49 820  17059  0.036  0.037  69575000 265263859 9069  62.30  82.99 19658 10172
1982  52 875  16777  0.036  0.037  74453000 247074040 9127  57.88  73.25 19272 10486
1983  51 903  18567  0.036  0.037  82317000 251128373 9861  54.14  67.93 19524 10857
1984  52 966  22698  0.036  0.036  82317000 250925052 9541  52.30  61.50 18540 11367
1985  51 919  23997  0.036  0.037  93460000 271096657 9886  48.45  60.79 19216 12036
1986  54 996  27234  0.036  0.037  107620000 302758652 9606  47.46  65.86 18788 12723
1987  55 957  38696  0.036  0.038  135184000 359481458 9589  51.16  73.73 19685 13586
1988  54 995  48806  0.036  0.037  180612000 391878202 9577  59.25  76.20 19637 14705
1989  55 983  49608  0.036  0.038  220710000 411503631 9876  66.47  73.38 20206 16287
1990  55 964  50007  0.036  0.038  252622000 465223083 9874  67.03  79.91 20990 17995
1991  58 1013  50200 0.036  0.038 295234000 470550503 9287  69.28  75.70  20620 18859*   
1992  58 934  55122  0.036 0.037  314737000 537866258 9614  69.01 81.76 22452  19510*   
Note: Exports, income, and capital per worker in thousand US$ 





   32
 










i θ  














1976 14 277  4047  0.036 0.036 18623000 84990625 7044  54.56 87.04 18350  9540
1977 21 358  3678  0.036  0.036  21816000 99322285 7591  55.71  81.29 17325 10531
1978 29 582  14909  0.036  0.036  26761000 258558278 8910  56.52  91.33 19951 11502
1979 39 751  15151  0.036  0.036  33199000 237118671 9067  58.56  89.10 18965 12507
1980 39 723  18780  0.036  0.036  41423000 277726185 9047  64.76  92.44 20050 13664
1981 42 746  21327  0.036  0.036  48141000 279075174 9268  66.59  81.98 19918 15036
1982 44 802  20024  0.036  0.036  48563000 263400227 9230  60.30  74.18 19890 16293
1983 45 830  22548  0.036  0.036  52415000 268560417 10098  57.19  69.32 20100 17415
1984 47 884  27421  0.036  0.036  59173000 267868425 9842  55.68  63.23 19272 18303
1985 49 921  26690  0.036 0.037 62080000 271235507 10283  53.44 59.74 19134 19194
1986 52 985  32571  0.036 0.038 75287000 303692136 10054  55.24 65.98 18461 20019
1987 52 960  45586  0.036 0.038  101651000 355762432 10532  63.83 74.11 19626 21061
1988 51 966  51705  0.036 0.037  123239000 401998245 10078  70.37 77.86 20032 22395
1989 51 879  60069  0.036 0.038  149159000 449974129 10266  77.02 76.16 21554 24067
1990 54 949  54912  0.036 0.038  160393000 465486712 10331  75.83 80.22 21050 25722
1991 57 963  62551  0.036 0.038  179405000 496877121 9755  75.58 77.87 21119 28184
1992 57 908  69602  0.036 0.037  212166000 546018986 10208  81.51 81.95 22504 30708
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Table 2: Grubel-Lloyd Indices 
3-digit 4-digit  
  Korea  no. obs Taiwan no. obs Korea  no. obs  Taiwan  no. obs
1976 0.083 392 0.120 392 0.062 1148 0.079 1148
1977 0.098 504 0.098 588 0.072 1476 0.062 1722
1978 0.134 812 0.161 812 0.087 2378 0.104 2378
1979 0.138 1036 0.162 1092 0.100 3034 0.115 3198
1980 0.133 1092 0.168 1092 0.096 3198 0.114 3198
1981 0.115 1372 0.147 1176 0.080 4018 0.101 3444
1982 0.111 1456 0.159 1232 0.081 4264 0.108 3608
1983 0.127 1428 0.160 1260 0.096 4182 0.107 3690
1984 0.143 1456 0.154 1316 0.106 4264 0.112 3854
1985 0.144 1428 0.155 1372 0.099 4182 0.113 4018
1986 0.161 1512 0.161 1456 0.119 4428 0.115 4264
1987 0.161 1540 0.177 1456 0.118 4510 0.129 4264
1988 0.175 1512 0.199 1428 0.130 4428 0.137 4182
1989 0.184 1540 0.189 1428 0.133 4510 0.136 4182
1990 0.192 1540 0.184 1512 0.141 4510 0.129 4428
1991 0.188 1624 0.187 1596 0.141 4756 0.135 4674
1992 0.193 1624 0.200 1596 0.144 4756 0.140 4674  34
 
Table 3-A: 2SLS Regressions Explaining Korea’s Exports 
  76  77  78 79 80 81 82 83 84 























































  Transition Probabilities 
p01(w=1,I=0) 0.385 0.441  0.289  0.452  0.500 0.500 0.516 0.476 0.520 
p11(w=1,I=1) 1.000 0.966  0.983  0.974  0.980 0.980 0.978 0.981 0.975 













































































































2 R   0.356 0.294  0.295  0.289  0.287 0.292 0.292 0.335 0.374 
F[k,n] 27.02 25.76  46.36  54.53  53.14 61.88 65.47 83.61  101.54 
Log-L  -580  -743 -1378 -1678 -1643 -1885 -1967 -2062 -2105 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are log-transformed. Italicized and underlined numbers are statistically insignificant at any levels.   35
 
Table 3-A: 2SLS Regressions Explaining Korea’s Exports (continued) 
  85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 

















































  Transition Probabilities 
p01(w=1,I=0)  0.441 0.388 0.476 0.271 0.464 0.361 0.483 0.399 
p11(w=1,I=1)  0.974 0.970 0.977 0.968 0.975 0.965 0.964 0.966 

































































































2 R   0.385 0.409 0.421 0.396 0.403 0.424 0.426 0.392 
F[k,n] 102.18 117.72 115.90 108.34 109.28 114.38 120.15  98.37 
Log-L -2000 -2056 -1921 -2011 -1987 -1856 -1930 -1869 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are log-transformed. Italicized and underlined numbers are statistically insignificant at any levels.   36
 
Table 3-B: 2SLS Regressions Explaining Taiwan’s Exports 
  76  77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 























































  Transition Probabilities 
p01(w=1,I=0)  0.324  0.338 0.282 0.533 0.522 0.586 0.625 0.531 0.485 
p11(w=1,I=1)  0.971  0.945 0.964 0.983 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.965 













































































































2 R   0.366  0.280 0.254 0.254 0.267 0.276 0.257 0.280 0.269 
F[k,  n]  28.95  23.71 35.26 44.83 46.90 48.90 48.08 53.91 53.49 
Log-L  -568  -697  -1263 -1624 -1587 -1568 -1687 -1694 -1794 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are log-transformed. Italicized and underlined numbers are statistically insignificant at any levels.   37
Table 3-B: 2SLS Regressions Explaining Taiwan’s Exports (continued) 
  85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 

















































  Transition Probabilities 
p01(w=1,I=0) 0.462 0.385 0.417 0.321 0.379 0.345 0.374 0.276 
p11(w=1,I=1) 0.966 0.968 0.962 0.980 0.978 0.974 0.956 0.957 

































































































2 R   0.306 0.328 0.277 0.300 0.342 0.332 0.362 0.320 
F[k,  n]  65.60 74.96 56.80 63.66 71.07 72.45 81.47 64.62 
Log-L  -1833 -1882 -1837 -1831 -1691 -1791 -1712 -1635 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are log-transformed. Italicized and underlined numbers are statistically insignificant at any levels. 
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Table 4: Regime Selection Probabilities and Grubel-Lloyd Indices (Averages) 
  Korea Taiwan 
  Φ  GLI  1-Φ  1-Φ/ GLI Φ  GLI  1-Φ  1-Φ/ GLI
1976  0.946 0.083 0.054 0.650 0.880 0.120 0.120 1.001 
1977  0.900 0.098 0.100 1.021 0.820 0.098 0.180 1.840 
1978  0.933 0.134 0.067 0.501 0.867 0.161 0.133 0.828 
1979  0.913 0.138 0.087 0.630 0.869 0.162 0.131 0.808 
1980  0.935 0.133 0.065 0.489 0.878 0.168 0.122 0.728 
1981  0.904 0.115 0.096 0.837 0.847 0.147 0.153 1.042 
1982  0.896 0.111 0.104 0.933 0.853 0.159 0.147 0.925 
1983  0.912 0.127 0.088 0.694 0.826 0.160 0.174 1.089 
1984  0.876 0.143 0.124 0.872 0.812 0.154 0.188 1.226 
1985  0.881 0.144 0.119 0.830 0.803 0.155 0.197 1.268 
1986  0.850 0.161 0.150 0.930 0.776 0.161 0.224 1.394 
1987  0.835 0.161 0.165 1.024 0.766 0.177 0.234 1.325 
1988  0.823 0.175 0.177 1.011 0.759 0.199 0.241 1.210 
1989  0.820 0.184 0.180 0.980 0.771 0.189 0.229 1.213 
1990  0.798 0.192 0.202 1.055 0.759 0.184 0.241 1.309 
1991  0.797 0.188 0.203 1.080 0.739 0.187 0.261 1.394 
1992  0.808 0.193 0.192 0.992 0.742 0.200 0.258 1.291 
average 0.872  0.146  0.128  0.877 0.810 0.164 0.190 1.163 
ρ    0.894    0.622  
Note: Φ: Regime 1 probability; 1-Φ: Regime 2 probability; GLI: the Grubel-Lloyd index;ρ : the correlation coefficient   
between GL indices and regime selection probabilities 
 
 